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Abstract 
 
In some countries - the Netherlands, UK and USA - the expected economic implications of 
election platforms of political parties are evaluated by independent economic institutions 
prior to the election. This paper analyzes the merits and limitations of this process, taking 25 
years of Dutch experience as a point of reference. In particular in times of financial crisis and 
unsustainable public finance, evaluation of election platforms can serve as a disciplining 
device for unrealistic or (time) inconsistent promises by politicians. More in general, it can 
help political parties to credibly inform voters about the implications of their platforms, to 
design more efficient policies and to reach consensus on them. It can also create a level 
playing field for political parties not represented in the government, in particular those with 
limited resources for economic information and expertise. However, there may be adverse 
effects, in particular when trade-offs are presented in an unbalanced way or when the rules of 
the evaluation provide too much room for gaming and free lunches.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In some countries - the Netherlands, UK and USA - the expected economic implications of 
election platforms of political parties are evaluated by independent economic institutions 
prior to the election. We analyze the merits and limitations of this process, taking the Dutch 
experience as a point of reference2.  
 In the Netherlands, some months before the elections, on request of the political 
parties, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) publishes an 
economic evaluation of their election platforms. For example, what are the consequences of 
the platforms for the government budget, economic growth, employment, the purchasing 
power of various types of households and the environment? In March 2010, CPB compared 
the election plans of nine Dutch political parties (see CPB, 2010). This comparison and 
analysis was the seventh evaluation of election platforms in twenty-five years. 
 In the UK, since the election of 1997, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)3 publishes 
policy briefings during election time. These policy briefings review the policies advocated by 
the three main UK political parties in their ‘manifestos’. They also discuss the track record of 
current and previous government and the sustainability of public finance without any change 
in policy. A wide range of policy issues is covered, like ‘pensions and retirement’, 
‘environment’, ‘living standards, inequality and poverty’ and ‘families and children’. The 
latter includes policy proposals about education, parental leave, child care and relevant taxes 
and benefits. According to one of the major UK-newspapers, these IFS policy briefings are a 
great service to voters:  “Many voters will have asked themselves why the main parties have 
been so vague about what they intend to do about the crisis in public finances. But it took the 
IFS to launch a blunt, impartial and authoritatively damning attack on all three parties, 
accusing them of not being straight with voters” (The Independent, 6 May 2010).  
                                                 
2
 Previous assessments of the Dutch experience with the economic evaluation of election platforms are Haffner 
and Van Bergeijk (1994), Don (2003) and the papers in Graafland and Ros (2003).   
3
 The IFS is an independent economic research institute funded by public and private grants. It produces 
academic and policy related findings on UK taxation and public policy. It was launched in 1971 in order to 
improve UK tax policy and to make the UK tax debate more informed and rational by bringing together 
political, legal, accounting and economic arguments. Its first major success was the Meade report published in 
1978. This report by a committee chaired by Professor James Meade, winner of the Nobel Prize in economics in 
1977,  evaluated the UK tax system as a whole, what are the objectives,  to what extent are these objectives met 
by the current UK tax system and what reforms should be undertaken?   
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 In the USA, the estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) of budgetary 
costs and savings of some major policy proposals, e.g. on health care reform, play a major 
role in elections for president, the house and the senate4. CBO traditionally focuses on static 
scoring of such policy proposals, i.e. including the direct effects and their behavioral 
responses but without macroeconomic effects. However, since 2003, also the consequences 
of different macro-economic assumptions are shown (‘dynamic scoring’).     
 Though evaluation of election platforms by independent economic institutes is quite 
rare, calculating the budgetary costs of major policy proposals or analyzing their macro-
economic consequences are very common all over the world. Such analyses are used in 
political decision-making in many countries. Also international organizations, like OECD, 
IMF, the European Commission and the World Bank, make similar analyses. So, introducing 
independent evaluation of election platforms will generally imply two types of changes. 
Firstly, such methods currently often used for analyzing official government policy proposals 
are to be applied to the election platforms of government parties and opposition parties. 
Secondly, these analyses should be conducted by independent institutions instead of 
government units subject to political interference, e.g. a Ministry of Finance or research 
institutes with a clear political signature. This second type of change may turn out to be the 
most difficult. The abrupt end of the new Hungarian fiscal council shows that independent 
fiscal watchdogs are most useful when their advice bites most, but then they are also 
politically most vulnerable.  
 Economic theory on decision making in a democracy provides a rationale for 
independent evaluation of election platforms (see Swank, 2003). Decision making under 
direct democracy is likely based on too little information, because information is an (impure) 
public good. Collecting such information is costly and when collected also many others can 
benefit from this information. This raises a free rider problem. An alternative solution to 
ensure sufficient information for voters is to delegate the making of policy to a number of 
agents, i.e. introduce representative democracy instead of direct democracy. However, parties 
are inclined to provide incorrect information. They will adopt a view of the economy that is 
                                                 
4
 The CBO was established in 1974 to serve the American Congress and plays a major role in measuring the 
budgetary impact of new legislation and other policy proposals: “CBO’s score can doom legislation or smooth 
the way to passage; it can compel committees and members to modify pending legislation, even after political 
deals have been negotiated; and it can complicate or thwart the president’s legislative ambitions” (Schick, 2007, 
p. 133).   
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meant to increase their chances of winning the elections. Voters may also distrust this 
information for being politically biased, even when it is actually objective. Financing 
independent institutions for analyzing the economy and policy proposals may help to solve 
this information problem.  
 The first ideas for an economic analysis of election platforms in the Netherlands date 
back to 19725.  A national economic journal asked all major political parties to specify their 
proposals for five policy issues: wage and price policy, redistribution of income, 
employment, economic growth and spatial planning. Each issue was illustrated with 
questions, e.g.: 
• How should the government fight inflation? Should the wages of civil servants be 
frozen or should all price increases be forbidden? 
• Are you in favour of a maximum income and how high should this be? 
• How to avoid that young people do not find a job in line with their education? Should 
foreign employees continue to work in the Dutch economy? 
• Should economic growth be reduced in order to limit pollution and exhaustion of 
natural resources? 
• Should economic growth be reduced in the urban agglomeration in the Western part 
(the Randstad) and be stimulated in the Northern and Southern part of the 
Netherlands?  
The seven major political parties wrote an essay on these issues and these essays were 
published three weeks before the elections. The editorial motivated this interrogation of 
political parties: “Dutch political parties fail continuously in being frank and transparent 
about their political preferences and policy proposals. For problems like the environment, 
transport, spatial planning and inflation only ad hoc measures are taken that avoid hurting the 
voters. ... Political parties try to seduce voters by vague promises instead of by being honest 
and clear about how to fight inflation and reduce the negative effects of economic growth’ (p. 
1057).  
In this editorial, the idea of an independent evaluation of election platforms is related 
to the credibility and commitment problem of politics. Since voters have a hard time to 
evaluate the costs of policy proposals, politicians are tempted to make more promises than is 
financially viable. Furthermore, politicians are tempted to spend money on specific interest 
groups today, as to achieve their electoral support, leaving the distribution of the tax burden 
                                                 
5
 See ESB, Dutch Journal on Economics and Statistics, No 2874, pp. 1057-1079. 
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to finance this spending open for future decision making. All kind of institutions have been 
designed to resolve these problems6, fiscal councils being a rather recent new branch on this 
tree. Fiscal councils are supposed to provide an independent analysis of the governments’ 
fiscal policy on a regular basis (see Hagemann, 2010, Calmfors, 2011 and Calmfors and 
Wren-Lewis, 2011 for an overview). The evaluation of election platforms can be interpreted 
as another branch of this tree or just a new task for fiscal councils.7 
 A major merit of evaluating election platforms is the timing. For a fiscal watchdog to 
be effective, providing information and policy advice at a very early stage of decision-making 
is important. This maximizes the time for interaction with policy makers, reduces conflicts 
with policy makers (in particular when such information comes as an unhappy surprise) and 
reduces the likelihood that policy advice is ignored simply because it conflicts with earlier 
political statements. According to the IFS “With public attention more focused on policy 
debates than usual, the election campaign is one of the best opportunities we have to ensure 
that the sort of rigorous, evidence-based social science research that we undertake has a high 
impact on policy development and  discussion” (IFS Policy Briefings for the General 
Election, 2010).  
 The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the history of the 
evaluation of election platforms in the Netherlands. Section 3 provides an overview of 
various approaches to the evaluation of election platforms, varying in scope from just an 
overview of direct budgetary effects to full-fledged welfare analysis including their general 
equilibrium effects.  Section 4 discusses in greater detail the rules of the ‘game’ in the 
Netherlands. For example: How do you ensure the quality and neutrality of the evaluation?  
And how to avoid political parties will manipulate the game? Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6
 Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) distinguish six reasons for deficit bias: informational problems (e.g. due to 
over-optimism among voters or politicians about future economic growth), impatience, exploitation of future 
generations, electoral competition, common-pool problems and time inconsistency.  
7
 Calmfors (2011) distinguishes six tasks for fiscal councils: 1. Provision of ‘objective’ macro economic 
forecasts on which government budget proposals can be based. 2. Costing of various government policy 
initiatives. 3. Ex ante evaluation of whether fiscal policy is likely to meet its medium-term targets. 4. Ex post 
evaluation of whether fiscal policy has met its targets. 5. Analysis of the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy 
and 6. Normative recommendations on fiscal policy. . The evaluation of election platforms should be added as a 
seventh task. 
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2. The Dutch history of evaluating election platforms 
 
The evaluation of election platforms in the Netherlands started in 1986. The CPB8, the 
government’s economic expert institute, had just published the new official macro-economic 
forecasts for the new period of government. The three major political parties asked then to 
investigate the economic consequences of their election platforms. To what extent would 
these proposals help to increase economic growth and improve public finance? And what 
would be the consequences for unemployment and the purchasing power of various groups of 
households? CPB prepared for each party a separate paper. These three papers were 
published jointly after the election.  
 Three years later, four political parties requested an evaluation of their election 
platforms and the results were jointly published a month before the election. As a 
consequence, since 1989 the results of the evaluation of election platforms have played an 
explicit role in Dutch elections.    
 
  
                                                 
8
 CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) is the oldest fiscal council in the world. It was 
founded in 1945. CPB is fully independent as far as the contents of its work are concerned. It is publicly funded 
and part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation. Research is carried out on CPB’s own 
initiative, or at the request of the government, parliament, trade unions or employers’ federations. Forecasts and 
analyses by CPB play a major role in the official decision-making process of Dutch economic and fiscal policy 
(see Bos and Teulings, 2010).  
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Table 1.   Evaluation of election platforms in the Netherlands (1986-2010) 
 
 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Number of political parties 3       4 5 5 8 8 9 
Seats in parliament prior to elections      133      137      131    137     123     139 148 
A. Direct budgetary effects during the next election cycle 
 -  Overview of budget cuts, 
expenditure and taxes 
x x x x x x x 
-  Detailed overview of policy 
measures  
  x x x x x 
-  Overview of  policy measures by 
function 
    x x x 
-  Effect on government deficit and 
debt 
x x x x x x x 
-  Effect on employment in the 
government and healthcare sector 
    x x x 
B. Economic feedbacks on budget, 
labour market and bbp during the 
next cycle 
x x x x x x (a) 
C. Long term effects on labour market 
and bbp 
 x x x x x x 
D. Effects on purchasing power of 
various groups of households 
x x x x x x (a) 
E.  Long term effects on budget     x x x 
F. An analysis of the impact on specific sectors 
-  Environment and mobility   x x x (a) x 
-  Education and innovation      x x 
-  Health Care  x   x  x 
G. An analysis of the impact on 
specific sectors using a welfare 
criterion 
      x 
(a) Absent due to time restrictions following the fall of the government 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the seven evaluations of election platforms in the 
Netherlands. We report the number of political parties that participate and the number of 
seats in parliament these parties cover. Furthermore, we report the scope of the evaluation, 
using exactly the same categories as will be applied in our theoretical discussion in the next 
section. 
 Three conclusions can be drawn straight away. First, the number of parties that 
participate in the evaluation has steadily increased from three to nine. During the past 25 
years, the political landscape in the Netherlands has become fragmented. More and more 
parties participate in the election and more and more parties gain access to the parliament. In 
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1968, the three major parties had 90% of the seats in Parliament; at present, this been reduced 
to 55%. Despite this fragmentation, the number of seats in parliament covered in the 
evaluation has been rather stable and covers now even 99% of all seats. This is remarkable, 
since CPB only evaluates a program on request of a political party. Hence, parties can refuse 
to participate in the evaluation. Nevertheless, almost all parties choose to do so.  
 Apparently, the revelation principle is at work here. Given that the institution of the 
evaluation of election platforms has obtained a vested position in the Dutch political system, 
new parties find it indispensable to participate, since non-participation would inevitably send 
a signal to the voters that the party’s election platform is economically unsound. Though the 
great majority of the voters will not spend a minute in reading the evaluation, many 
journalists do, and they report extensively on the evaluation in the newspapers and politicians 
refer repeatedly to the evaluation during their television performances. Moreover, the 
evaluation plays a major role in the negotiations on a new government that start immediately 
after the election. Not all parties participate in these negotiations, but a party of which the 
platform has not been evaluated would become less attractive as a coalition partner and will 
start the negotiation process with a backlog.  
 This revelation principle is well illustrated by the participation of the GreenLeft Party 
since 1994, the Socialist Party and SGP since 2002 and the PVV since 2010. The decision to 
participate by the GreenLeft Party and the Socialist Party was part of an official change in 
strategy. Their new strategy was to become regarded as a serious opposition party with a high 
quality program and to increase their chances for participating in a new coalition government. 
Following this strategy, it does not suffice to say no to policy proposals by the government. 
Each time, a realistic and financially sound alternative should be presented. Independent 
evaluation of their election platform fitted well in this new strategy.  The SGP (a small right-
wing Christian party) was very reluctant to participate, but felt forced to do it because a direct 
political opponent (ChristenUnie, another small Christian party) decided to join (see van 
Liedekerke, 2003, p. 142). Since 2005, there is a major new political party: PVV (an anti-
Islam party). Last year, it also decided to request for evaluation of its election platform. This 
party has now become the official supporter of the current minority government. Its success 
in the elections and its important role in current Dutch government would have been unlikely 
without such evaluation of its election platform.     
 A second conclusion is that over time the description of policy proposals and their 
direct budgetary effects became much more detailed, extended and comparable. In the first 
decade, only an overview was provided of the major budget cuts, extra government 
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expenditure and tax measures. Since mid 1990s, also a more detailed description of policy 
measures is provided. Since 2002, changes in government expenditure or taxes are broken 
down by function, e.g. public administration, defense, education, health care, social security 
and transfers to corporations. As a consequence, the policy measures of political parties can 
now be compared by function.  
 A third conclusion that can be drawn from Table 2 is that the scope of the analysis has 
increased gradually. The core part of the Dutch evaluation of election platforms consist of 
four components, all pertaining to the next period of government9: 
• Description of policy measures.  
• Direct budgetary effects of the policy proposals, i.e. what are direct effects on the 
government deficit and debt in billion euro and as percentage of GDP without taking 
into account interactions with the national economy. In practice, this may include 
some behavioural effects, e.g. evasion of taxes or effects on the labour supply not 
incorporated in the macro-economic model.    
• Analysis with a macro-model showing feedback effects for a core set of macro-
variables, like economic growth, inflation, employment and the government budget. 
The direct budgetary effects of the policy proposals are used as inputs for this 
analysis.  
• Analysis of the change in purchasing power of various groups of households. This 
includes the direct effects of policy proposals on household income plus the macro-
economic effects on purchasing power, e.g. via changes in prices and wage rates.  
 
Over the years, the core set of four components has been supplemented with other 
information. Since 2002, the analysis of direct budgetary effects has been extended with 
information on the employment effects for the government sector (broken down into e.g. 
central government, local government, safety, defense and education) and health care. A 
major purpose of many policy proposals is to establish long term effects that become only 
                                                 
9
 In 2010, due to the unexpected fall of government, time constraints implied that of this core-part of the 
evaluation only the description of proposals and their direct budgetary effects could be presented. Most of the 
political parties were not very happy with the absence of effects on purchasing power and medium-term macro-
economic effects. For two parties, next time such absence of a politically very important part of effects of might 
be a reason not to participate. 
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visible after the next period of government. Long run labor market effects have been 
discussed since 1989.  The scope of such long analyses has been extended each time. The 
analysis of the effects on environment, congestion and mobility was included since 1994.10  
Long term effects on government finance have been included since 2002. Since 2006, also 
the long run effects of proposals with respect to education and innovation are being assessed 
and last year an analysis of the housing market has been added. Last year, an innovation of 
the analysis of education and innovation was the link with long term economic growth. A 
specific feature of the housing market analysis and the analysis of mobility was that an 
estimate of welfare effects was included.  Reform of health care was often a major issue in 
Dutch policy. Analyses of the major issues involved have therefore been included in 1989, 
2002 and 2010.  As a consequence of all these extensions, the evaluation provides a very 
broad overview of the consequences and trade-offs of the policy platforms of Dutch political 
parties.  
 
 
Table 2 The consequences of the election platforms of 2 Dutch political parties in 2010: Summary 
overview  (changes relative to basis, unless otherwise mentioned; Dutch GDP in 2010 about 600 
bln euro) 
   SP VVD      
          
Improvement EMU-balance 2015 (euro bn; ex 
ante)   10 20      
Sustainability of public finances (euro bn)   16 39      
Purchasing power of households 2015 (euro 
bn, ex ante)   + 1¼ − 1½      
Profits of companies 2015 (including housing 
corporations) (euro bn, ex ante)   − 4¼ − 1¼      
Structural employment (% point)   − 1 5¾      
Accessability by public or private transport 
(welfare gain, bn euro)   – ¼ ¼      
Car usage (2020, in %) 
   0 0      
Public transport usage (2020, in %) 
 
  + 5 0      
Reduction of greenhouse gases (Mton Co2)   21 2      
Quality of nature (2020)   + – –      
Quantity of nature (2020)   0/– – –      
GDP effect education (structural, %)   ¼ 4      
                                                 
10
 In 2006 this was not possible due to time constraints resulting from an unexpected fall of government. In 
2002, three of the eight participating parties, i.e. 71 seats in parliament, opted out for such analysis. In the 
evaluation of 2010, such opting out was not allowed anymore: political parties were given the choice either to 
participate on all issues or not to participate (see section 4).  
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Science/innovation 2015 (budget, mld 
euro)   − 0.06 − 0.1      
Housing market (welfare gains % gdp)   0.4 0.3      
Change in house prices (2015, %)   − 6 − 2      
Change in net rent (2015, %)   − 3 10      
Health care, employment, 2015, thsnd )   +15 – 50      
Own risk health insurance (2015, level, 
euro) 
  0 300      
More (+) or less (− ) market forces cure   – – ++      
 
This is illustrated by table 3, which presents a summary of the outcome of the evaluation in 
2010 for the two parties with the most special election platforms, the Socialist Party (SP) and 
the Liberal Conservatives (VVD). The differences in the platforms are clearly visible. The 
Socialist Party has a much more lenient position regarding the reduction of the budget deficit 
than the Liberal Conservatives, both by the end of the election cycle in 2015 and in the long 
run sustainability gap. Obviously, cutting public expenditure more heavily as done by the 
Liberal Conservatives implies that purchasing power is reduced more strongly. The Socialist 
Party cares less about profits and more about the environment and Health Care than the 
Liberal Conservatives. Liberal Conservatives want to raise housing rents and private 
contributions in health care and want to introduce market forces in the organization of 
healthcare. The evaluation of the election platforms offers therefore a clear overview of two 
entirely different policy views. 
 There are several mechanisms underlying the gradual increase in scope (see also 
section 3). First, a partial evaluation has loopholes. Parties seek the weak points in the 
evaluation by making proposals of which the benefits are communicated clearly in the 
evaluation, but of which the cost fall outside the scope of the evaluation, in particular for 
budgetary cost beyond the end of the next election cycle. An attempt to cover these loopholes 
leads to a gradual trend towards an increasing scope of the evaluation. Second, political 
parties have diverging preferences regarding the topics on which they want to focus the 
election campaign. Green parties want to focus on environmental problems, conservative 
parties stress issues of law and order, liberal parties put most attention on education. Each 
party feels set at a backlog by not including (or: treating less extensively) their favorite topic. 
This yields a strong pressure to cover ever more special topics in the evaluation. 
 The evaluation of election platforms is fully embedded in the official decision-making 
process for the next period of government, i.e. in deciding on the new policy plans and new 
fiscal framework (see Bos, 2008 and Bos and Teulings, 2010).  After the election, the 
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evaluation plays a major role during the formation of a new coalition agreement11. The 
evaluation offers an initial overview of the economic and financial implications of the 
parties’ proposals.  It is therefore a good starting point for negotiating the terms of a coalition 
agreement12. This applies not only to the proposals of parties involved in the coalition 
agreement. In practice, the evaluation serves as a data base on all kinds of policy measures 
that could be considered during the negotiations; in particular the budget cuts and extra 
revenue generating measures by other parties are a popular source of inspiration. On request 
of the political parties involved, CPB commonly provides also analyses of provisional and 
final coalition agreements.  
 Measuring the actual impact in the Netherlands of evaluating election platforms is 
difficult. Its impact should be assessed by comparison to a non-observable counterfactual, i.e. 
what would have happened without such evaluation? Would the political platforms have been 
different, would voters have voted differently and would coalition-agreements and actual 
policy practice have been different? At the start of the 1980s, already before the start of 
evaluating election platforms, major political parties agreed on drastic fiscal consolidation 
and restructuring of the Dutch economy. So, what would have been at that time the value 
added of evaluating election platforms, e.g. when CPB would have decided unilaterally to 
start such evaluation and publish the results before the elections?  Similarly, what would have 
been the most recent political platforms and coalition agreement without any evaluation of 
the election platforms?  
 However, Dutch politicians agree that evaluating election platforms makes a 
substantial difference. For example, after the unexpected fall of the previous government, the 
most recent election date was set in such a way to leave just sufficient time for an evaluation 
of election platforms. According to Dutch politicians, the direct benefits for the general 
public at large must not be exaggerated (see Liedekerke, 2003). Few voters will read the 
evaluation report, but fall back upon media analysis of the report. But press reports magnify 
certain results, sometimes completely forget others that might be just as interesting and could 
                                                 
11
 In the Netherlands, parties usually form governments on the basis of wide-ranging coalition agreements.  The 
coalition agreement plays an exceedingly important role during the government’s term in office. It sets out the 
result of the give and take among the coalition partners on many policy issues.  
12
 So, for this purpose, the overview of the policy proposals by political parties in the evaluation is preferred to 
the officially platforms published by the political parties themselves. The latter may differ in content and detail 
substantially from that used in the evaluation, see section 4.  
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even be seriously flawed. Political parties can play a role in this by framing and spinning the 
results.  
 Dutch political parties seem to agree that the major and direct beneficiaries of the 
evaluation are the political parties themselves. “The calculation effort pushes parties to be 
clear about their political programme and final options; it confronts them with hard choices 
that might be left unnoticed if not for the CPB involvement. In short: the calculation 
disciplines parties and precludes that wishful thinking turns into party politics. ... the content 
of the political programme cannot be made up of elusive promises.. it pushes the discussion 
within the political party itself to a higher level, in which people have to think twice before 
introducing a proposal. Wild politics is weeded out.... cross-party discussion will become 
smoother, because everybody is constrained by the same analytical framework and used to 
the same types of ever returning arguments (what will this proposal cost, how effective can it 
be, et cetera). Political discussion civilizes through the exposure to the calculation effort. ... 
[It] brings political programmes closer together and therefore simplifies the cabinet formation 
process” (Liedekerke, 2003, p. 138).         
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3. What is the proper scope of the evaluation? 
 
From a pure economic theory perspective, the platform of a political party only has to make 
statements about the preferred welfare distribution within and between generations, since 
these statements are normative. Conditional on this preferred distribution of income/welfare, 
the Pareto criterion allows ranking all alternatives according to their efficiency (since income 
is just one aspect of welfare, we refer to the distribution of welfare rather than income in what 
follows). This ranking belongs to the domain of positive analysis and can therefore in 
principle be done by scientists. Since society can be classified in large number of subgroups, 
each with different attributes and interests, even this relatively simple objective of a preferred 
distribution of welfare is a multidimensional problem. Since any change of institutions 
always affects both efficiency and the distribution of welfare and since instruments to redress 
the distributional effects of institutional change are usually missing, the debate on the 
appropriate distribution of welfare inevitably spills over into the debate on the efficiency. 
Hence, even when politicians focus strictly on the welfare distribution, the decision problem 
remains highly complicated. 
 However, reducing politics to the problem of a preferred welfare distribution 
constrains the domain of politics too much. Politicians have views on a much wider set of 
issues than just the welfare distribution. For example, whether or not healthcare should be 
privatized invokes a political debate that cannot be reduced to distributional issues alone. 
Ranking both sides of the debate on a welfare criterion would probably be a misperception of 
the political content of that debate. Alternatively, one could sketch the effects of various 
policy options and the tradeoffs that it involves which go beyond the traditional fundamental 
trade off, that between equity and efficiency. These observations raise the question how to set 
up an meaningful evaluation of election platforms. If constraining politics to a statement on 
the proper welfare distribution does not work, what else can be a defendable position about 
the scope of an economic/scientific evaluation of election platforms without the evaluation 
itself becoming a political statement?  
 Table 3 provides an overview of various topics that can be included in the evaluation. 
The topics are ranked in the order of an increasing scope: an evaluation should at least 
include topic A and can be gradually extended by including further options, starting from 
option B. The table provides a summary of the main arguments pro and contra the extension 
of the evaluation with that topic. Below, each option will be discussed in greater detail. In our 
discussion of the pros and cons of very alternatives we draw upon the Dutch experience. The 
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first evaluation in 1986 covered the topics A, B, and D. The last evaluation in 2010 covered 
all topics A till G, except for topic B and D, which were omitted for lack of time (the 
elections were held prematurely due to the collapse of the previous government). 
 
Table 3.  A summary of pros and cons of various approaches to the evaluation of election 
platforms 
Topic Advantage Drawback 
A. Direct budgetary effects during 
the next election cycle 
1. simplicity 
2. close alignment to the role of 
fiscal watchdog 
1. no trade offs shown 
2. implications for deficit in later cycles ignored 
B. Economic feedbacks on budget, 
labour market and bbp during the 
next cycle 
1. shows medium run economic 
effects of policies  
1. overrates expansionary policies and 
underrates structural reform 
C. Long term effects on labour 
market and bbp 
1. shows implications for a 
snapshot of the welfare 
distribution 
2. provides insight in the tradeoff 
political parties face 
1. ignores changes in socio economic status 
2. ignores lifecycle effects 
D. Effects on purchasing power of 
various groups of households 
1. avoids the trap of overrating 
the short run effect on effective 
demand 
1. puts a high burden of proof on the 
assessment of long run effects  
E.  Long term effects on budget 1. avoids burden shifting to future 
governments 
1. raises a commitment issue: what is the value 
of early announcement of future policies? 
2. how to deal with issues where nobody has a 
serious plan regarding the future? 
3. if combined with alternative D: how to deal 
with variations in future growth rates? 
4. trade off between long term government 
finance and long term household 
income/profits is not shown 
F. An analysis of the impact on 
specific sectors, e.g. education 
1. provides a broader overview of 
the effect of platforms 
2. helps creating consensus on the 
economic impact of policies 
1. choice of sectors to include is arbitrary 
2. requires detailed knowledge of these sectors 
3. not only of first order, but also of second 
order effects 
4. prior communication with political parties 
required 
5. risk of gaming 
G. An analysis of the impact on 
specific sectors using a welfare 
criterion 
1. allows an integral evaluation of 
costs and benefits of e.g. market 
distortions of taxes and subsidies 
1. limits the role of political preference beyond 
what politicians view as their area of 
competence 
2. marginal utilities (prices) to tradeoff various 
inputs are not always available 
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 Topic A. Direct budgetary effect for the next election cycle 
The simplest evaluation is just an analysis of the effects of the proposed election platform on 
the government budget by the end of the next election cycle (each election cycle coincides 
with the term of a cabinet, which lasts 4 years, unless the cabinet looses confidence in 
parliament during the cycle). This position links directly to the role of fiscal watchdogs. 
Parties are evaluated by the effect of their program on the government budget. Anything else 
is left over to the marketing skills of the political parties and to the imagination of the voters. 
The advantage of this position is that its modesty is easily defendable. However, the evaluator 
does not provide the voter any help in grasping the implications of the proposed policies. 
More seriously, by focusing on the consequences for the budget by the end of the next 
election cycle, one runs the risk that political parties seek proposals that provide means for 
the next government and shift the burden for the budget to future governments. For example, 
parties have proposed to change the fiscal treatment of pension premiums. Currently, pension 
contributions are tax deductible, while benefits are taxed. Reversing that rule reduces the 
budget deficit at the end of the current election cycle, but raises it in the future. 
 
Topic B. Economic feedbacks on budget, (un)employment, and GDP 
One further step is to include the indirect effects of the election platforms for the budget, the 
labour market, and GDP by the end of the election cycle. This provides information on the 
impact of an election platform on the economy. The caveat of including these economic 
feedbacks at the end of the election cycle is that they are likely to be dominated by medium 
run effects of policies on effective demand. For example, suppose that the budget deficit and 
unemployment have gone up during the past election cycle due to a recession. Suppose one 
party wants to counter these adverse effects by reducing the replacement rates. In the short 
run this reduces effective demand due to the reduction in purchasing power for the 
unemployed. The positive effect of lower benefits on the budget deficit might therefore be 
offset by lower consumption taxes. In the long run the lower benefits and the effect of a lower 
replacement rate lead to a reduction of the deficit. Similarly, expenditure cuts might reduce 
the deficit, but raise unemployment due to their effect on effective demand. Since these cuts 
have to be made anyway to keep the budget balanced, this is merely an issue of timing. As 
long as the evaluation does not provide the voter a shadow price of a lower deficit by the end 
of the election in terms of future GDP and future (un)employment, the voter will find it hard 
to weight short run benefits agains long run cost. Establishing this shadow price is therefore a 
mayor challenge for economic theory, which has not been solved till today.  
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 Summarizing, structural policies proposals are underrated by including only an 
evaluation of the economic impact during the next election cycle, since the evaluation is 
dominated by medium run effects on effective demand, while the structural effects tend to 
take longer before they are fully realized. For example, according to the evaluation of the 
election platforms of 2006, the greatest difference in unemployment rate between two parties 
was 0.4 %-point. One party proposed a reduction of the replacement rate by 2.5% point. The 
main positive effect of this measure on labor supply and GDP is realized only after the end of 
the next election cycle. For this reason, some observers/economists prefer leaving out the 
medium run economic effects and concentrating on the structural effects. 
 
Topic C. Long term effects on (un)employment and GDP 
An obvious solution to the problem of overrating the medium term effects of policies on 
effective demand is to include an analysis of their structural or long terms effects in the 
evaluation. However, this puts a large burden of proof on the estimates of long run 
equilibrium effects of policies. Moreover, the public find it a hard to believe these long run 
effects, while the short run effects on effective demand have larger credibility in the eyes of 
the public. From an insider point of view, these judgments are highly debatable. For example, 
recent studies of the CPB on the effects tax reforms on labour supply reveal that the estimates 
of their effects are highly reliable, while the effects on effective demand are might be far 
more debatable. These conclusions are in line with similar evidence of the Institute of Fiscal 
Studies for the United Kingdom.  
 
Topic D. Effects on purchasing power of various groups of households 
One step further is to include the effect of policy proposals on the purchasing power of 
various subgroups in society during the next period of government. From the point of view 
that politics most important role is to decide on the welfare distribution, this is obviously 
meaningful information for the voter. The combination of this topic and topic D. gives a 
handle on the tradeoff between equity and efficiency.  
 However, there is a major caveat here. The tradeoff between equity and efficiency 
stems from policy makers’ inability to distinguish between effort and ability. Hence, 
redistributive taxation undermines the incentives for providing effort, or equivalently, it 
reduces labour supply. A positive evaluation of this trade off requires a broadly shared view 
on the elasticity of labor supply and the effect of the replacement rate on unemployment. 
Such an agreement might be hard to achieve.  
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 As argued by Piketty (1995), political parties might be deeply divided on this issue for 
perfectly understandable reasons. Effort, social background, and income are positively 
correlated. Left wing parties might explain these positive correlations by arguing that income 
is determined social background determines income, while right wing parties might stress the 
role of effort. Since left wing people usually have a lower social background than right wing 
people, they provide less effort since they think it does not matter anyway, while right wing 
people think the opposite and therefore provide a lot of effort. These beliefs and the 
behaviour they induce generate exactly the correlations that we find in the data. Therefore, an 
econometrician might have a hard time to provide convincing evidence on the benefit of 
either side. This shows why the classical distinction between positive statements on 
efficiency and normative statement on the distribution of welfare is not that clear cut in 
practice.  
 Remarkably, a generally accepted view on this issue has emerged in the Netherlands. 
The CPB has modeled the labor market in its MIMIC model (see Gelauff and Graafland, 
1994, Donders and Graafland, 2000 and Folmer, 2009). This exercise has generated a view 
on the relevant elasticities that is broadly accepted by all political parties. 
 Focusing on the direct effect of policies for purchasing power keeping constant the 
socio economic status of a person ignores an important aspect of the tradeoff between equity 
and efficiency. Reducing the replacement rate lowers the purchasing power of an 
unemployed, but raises the probability for that person to get reemployed. By keeping constant 
the socio economic status, this aspect is ignored. From the point of view of individual 
households (see Di Tella et.al. 2001 and 2003), losing one’s job has much larger implications 
for well being than slight policy changes regarding tax brackets or replacement rates. 
Ignoring these implications overstates the negative effects of this type of policies. 
 A further drawback of this analysis of purchasing power is that it focuses on the 
current status and ignores future effects. This is a serious limitation when analyzing for 
example the intergenerational impact on lifetime welfare of increasing the retirement age.   
 
Topic E. Long term effects on budget 
When an economy is approximately in a steady state, there is little need for a separate 
analysis of the effect of election platforms on future government budgets. As long as a policy 
leads to a balanced budget today, it will also do so in the future. However, the economies of 
all OECD countries are not at all in steady state. The ageing of society is a major risk for the 
long run sustainability of the public finances. Any policy increasing public pensions or health 
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care for elderly is currently affordable, but might be a nightmare in the future. Hence, it is 
useful to include a long term perspective in the evaluation of election platforms. This 
approach is particularly useful for an evaluation of the level of public debt at the end of the 
next election cycle. As noted before, the economic discipline has not agreed on a proper 
shadow price for public debt. In a long term framework, the intertemporal budget constraint 
solves this issue. The requirement not to let public debt explode provides a meaningful 
constraint. 
 Inspired by generational accounting developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff 
(1991), CPB has worked out a set of rules for the long term evaluation of public finance. We 
summarize the main lines below13. The growth of labour productivity is assumed to be 
exogenous and a series of policy parameters are fixed at their current level, like the ratio of 
the public elderly pension to wages, health care expenditure per person of a particular age 
divided by the real wage, and tax revenues and public consumption, the latter two as a share 
of GDP. Using the expected evolution of the demographic composition of the population 
(accounting for the expected increase in life expectancy), we can calculate the evolution of 
the primary surplus and public debt. It would be accidental if the debt ratio would converge 
to a stable path. The expenditure cut required to let the debt ratio converge is called the 
sustainability gap. The platforms of political parties are evaluated by their effect on the 
sustainability gap and the distribution of purchasing power across generations. When a party 
submits a platform that does not close the gap, the CPB arbitrarily closes the gap, e.g. in 
2040, by raising the tax rate. In that case, future generations will bear a disproportional share 
of the burden of implicit public debt. This provides an objective shadow price for public debt: 
the purchasing power of future generations14. 
 Although this approach is quite effective in dealing with the long term budget 
constraint of the government, this approach faces a number of hairy problems. In the simple 
set up of scenario A that started the whole exercise, the CPB allowed parties to submit 
proposals that could be implemented during the next election cycle and evaluated these 
proposals solely by their effect on the deficit by the end of that cycle. Parties were not 
allowed to submit proposals that had an effect only after the end of the next election. The 
                                                 
13
 For a more detailed description, see Draper and Armstrong (2009) and Horst et al. (2010). 
14
 The interest rate could also be regarded as a shadow price of public debt. However, business cycle effects, 
specific market circumstances and central bank policies to keep interest rates close to zero in order to stimulate 
economic growth can invalidate the interest rate as a shadow price of public debt.    
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sustainability analysis opened the way for proposals that were relevant only for their effects 
on the long run. But what is the credibility of a proposal that is only going to have real effects 
20 years from now? Is such a proposal credible in the first place? Fundamentally, politics is 
not able to commit itself, because there is no outside power that can force politics to live up 
to its promises, see Acemoglu (2003). Moreover, the politicians that rule 20 years from now 
are different from those who rule today. Why would future politicians consider themselves to 
be committed to the proposals done by their predecessors? Hence, the CPB has imposed a 
number of constraints for a long term policy proposal to be included in the evaluation of 
election platforms for the current election cycle. We return to this issue in section 4 when 
discussing the rules of the game. 
 Further complications arise when these long term projections for the budget are 
combined with topic D., the long term effects of policies on (un)employment and GDP. 
Suppose a party wants to raise future GDP by investing in education. Since many policy 
parameters are expressed as a share of GDP (or: real wages), an increase in productivity does 
not have as beneficial an effect on sustainability, since an increase in productivity raises 
expenditure one-for-one. Here, the stylized representation of policies as a fixed share of GDP, 
without taking into account the fact that a higher GDP implies more of the policy being 
available, disrupts the analysis. When these issues arise special attention is required to avoid 
bizarre conclusions. 
 
Topic F. Including extended analysis of specific sectors 
A further option is to include the analysis of the economic effects of policy proposals on 
specific sectors, and whenever possible also the spillover of these sectors to GDP and 
(un)employment. The problem is that the choice of what sectors to include is arbitrary. 
Sectors with a large public involvement are obviously the first candidates. However, the last 
evaluation of the CPB included education, highways/road pricing, and environment, but did 
not include the effects of changes in the police force and confined the analysis of health care 
mostly to summarizing the direct budgetary effects. Policy proposals with respect to 
education were classified into three groups: promising, not promising or neutral. A proposal 
is promising if its social benefits exceed the social costs. Proposals for which not sufficient 
empirical studies are available are put in the group ‘Effects not known”. Also a link was 
made with long term economic growth. Policy proposals regarded as promising or not 
promising are then quantified in terms of their effect on long term GDP volume growth.  
 In practice, three criteria determine whether or not or how a sector is included: 
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• An intensive public debate on a sector raises the likelihood of it being included.  
• Following up on the first criterion, when many political parties have announced 
proposals for that sector, a sector is likely to be included.  
• Finally, a sector can only be included when economic science has a well established 
body of knowledge about it.  
The latter criterion is quite important in practice. For example, the economic discipline has 
spent enormous resources to the analysis of education. This research has provided in great 
deal of broadly shared insights into the impact of education on the economy. Health care 
plays a larger role in the current political debate than education, not the least due to the 
ageing of the society. However, there is no generally accepted body of knowledge on the 
effect of competition policies for the health care system. Hence, a serious analysis of this 
issue in an evaluation of the election programs is hazardous. The evaluator can hardly avoid 
taking a political stance.  
 Here, the second and the third criterion contradict. Political parties demand the CPB 
to include healthcare in its evaluation of election platforms, because only by including health 
care, parties can credibly communicate their policy proposals to the voters. Since health care 
is at the political front line, it is quite understandable that political parties express this 
preference. At the same time, the CPB must restrain its judgments on this issue since there is 
no shared body of knowledge.  
 A serious complication in the analysis of specific sectors is that one needs to know 
not only the first order effect of a particular proposal, but also the second order effect. The 
reason for this necessity is simple. Suppose that a particular proposal has a positive net 
discounted value per euro spend and can be scaled up to any level. A typical example is 
raising the skill level of the workforce. Calculations by Hanushek and Woessman (2010) 
have shown that the net discounted value of investments in human capital is enormous. How 
should a proposal by a political party to double the expenditure on education be evaluated? 
Or to triple it, for that matter? Clearly, there must be a limit beyond which further 
investments no longer have a positive discounted value, the standard economic concept of 
diminishing returns. But what is that limit? As another example, most research suggests that 
reducing class size has a negative net discounted value, since it is costly and not very 
effective (see e.g. Dobbelsteen et al. 2002 and Woessman and West, 2006). Reversing the 
argument, increasing class size must have a positive discounted value. What to do when a 
political party proposes to raise class size to a 1000 pupils? In most cases, the discipline 
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spends a decade to decide on the magnitude of first order effect. Establishing the second 
order effect is likely to take at least another decade, see Teulings and Van Rens (2008) for a 
first attempt for investing in human capital.   
 There is a further reason for worry. If the argument regarding the importance of 
second order effects is correct, then using cross country evidence on the first order effect is 
inappropriate for the evaluation of the first order effect in particular country. The magnitude 
of the first order effect of an investment in education depends crucially on the initial state of a 
country’s education system. The effect of an improvement is likely to be much higher if the 
system is in a state of disarray than if the system is already functioning perfectly.  
 Ultimately, the issue is about the proper role of economists. Is their role to give a best 
judgment on what is a fruitful direction for policy makers to go, without claiming to have an 
idea about the optimum, or is their role to classify political parties on how close their 
proposals correspond to a hypothetical optimum? Given uncertainty on the first question, 
some restraint in answering the second might be appropriate. Remarkably, political parties 
press for answering the second, as this is a way for them to communicate the sincerity of their 
proposals to the voters. For example, the unwillingness of the CPB to assess the effect of a 
more market oriented organization of health care lead to an uproar among some political 
parties who made proposals in this area.  
 The positive way to view this process is that it is a reflection of the gradual emergence 
of a political consensus on what is an efficient policy. Similar to the way all political parties 
use the results of the Mimic model as a “true” representation of the tradeoff between equity 
and efficiency with regard to marginal tax rates, the pressure to include an economic analysis 
of the education system in the evaluation of election platforms can be interpreted as a process 
towards a shared view on the effect of education on the economy. This makes clear that the 
evaluation of election platforms along these lines is only feasible if there is public/scientific 
debate on the evaluation standards to be applied. 
 A final issue regarding the evaluation of specific sectors is the question whether 
political parties should be informed a priori about the evaluation-methods that will be 
applied. Not informing parties a priori makes the evaluation like a gambling game, where 
political parties have to guess about the methodology and hence the type of proposals that 
“score” best. In this way, the evaluation process is unlikely to contribute to sound economic 
policy. Moreover, the evaluation is allegedly based on scientific and hence reproducible 
knowledge. It is hard to square the presumption of reproducibility with not informing parties 
a priori about the methodology that is going to be applied.  
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 However, prior information will induce parties to try to game the system, finding 
loopholes in the announced methodology that yield an artificially positive evaluation. An 
escape clause for this type of practices is a minimum requirement for the credibility of the 
evaluation. However, there is a further complication. Making available the evaluation 
methodology implies that all parties have equal access to the effects attributed by the 
evaluator to all kind of policy proposal. What to do if a particular party comes up with a 
unique proposal not considered by other parties. Should other parties be informed about this 
proposal and the way in which it is evaluated? Or should this proposal be excluded from the 
evaluation on the grounds that the methodology for the evaluation of this proposal was not 
common knowledge among all parties? Stated differently: is a politician only involved in 
making normative choices on the proper distribution of welfare distribution, or is he also an 
entrepreneur who gets rewarded on the electoral market for coming up with Pareto 
improvements? In practice, the CPB has chosen to provide prior information on the 
methodology, but to allow political parties an advantage who come up with Pareto 
improvements themselves by not revealing these proposals to other parties. 
 
Topic G. Extended with a welfare criterion 
The evaluation under topic F. is restricted to some sector specific outcome, like health status 
(for health care), congestion (for infrastructure), or skill measures (for the education system) 
and effects on GDP and (un)employment. One can generalize the evaluation by using welfare 
criterion instead. The Hicks-Kaldor criterion -just adding up the monetary value of all 
relevant aspects, whether traded or not- is most convenient. Moreover, it is the only criterion 
that has an objective legitimate provided offsetting transfers can be implemented or that there 
are no a priori reasons that the existing welfare distribution is better justifiable than the 
alternative distribution. The latter might apply for institutional reforms in small sectors, 
where small groups of insiders capture large rents. The advantage of using a welfare criterion 
is that it provides an easy way of aggregating various aspects of people’s well being into a 
single statistic, in particular aspects that tend to be ignored when taking GDP as a criterion. 
Leisure is an obvious example. An evaluation of proposals according to their effect on GDP 
implicitly sets the value of a change in leisure equal to zero. A welfare criterion uses the net 
wage rate as the valuation/price of a change leisure. Using welfare allows a positive integral 
evaluation of all aspects that are shown to be relevant by applying people’s revealed 
preference for each of these aspects. 
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 However, the logic of the valuation of different aspects of well being by market prices 
is not easily communicated to the wider public. The paradox of the public perception of 
economics is that it blames economics for focusing on monetary GDP only and ignoring 
other aspects of well being. However, at the same time it views the standard approach of 
economics for including these aspects as an inappropriate intervention in the domain of other 
social sciences. Economists are imprisoned in the cave of the concept of GDP while at the 
same time being accused of not willing to leave the cave. It is reflected in the conviction of 
politicians that increasing hours worked is economically beneficial, irrespective of the value 
of a reduction of leisure. Though unsatisfactory from an economist’ point of view, this is the 
way it is. One interpretation is that we allow consumers to decide in the tradeoff between for 
example butter and milk on the basis of market prices, but that we want politicians to decide 
in the tradeoff between leisure and other consumption, based on politicians’ rather than 
consumers’ relative valuations of leisure versus other consumption. One might wonder why, 
but that being the case, the only option for an evaluation of election platforms is to provide 
separate information on the effects on GDP and leisure, and leave aggregation of both aspects 
to the voters/politicians.  
 In practice, using the welfare concept is therefore appropriate only in small number of 
special cases. The CPB has applied the concept when evaluating proposals to the reform of 
the housing market. This market is heavily distorted, both its rental and its private ownership 
segment. The CPB designed a method to evaluate the cost of these distortions, using the 
concept of a Harberger triangle (see Hines jr., 1999). In this way, reforms could be evaluated 
both on their effect on “aggregate” welfare as on the welfare distribution. The welfare 
concept is the only way to give voters a handle on the size of the distortions implied by 
prevailing institutions. 
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4. Which rules of the game? 
 
The evaluation of elections platforms can be regarded as a game in which political parties 
compete for maximizing the number of votes for their party while respecting their 
fundamental political preferences. The benefits of evaluating election platforms depend 
critically on the rules of this game. For example, it is important that the rules give the right 
incentives to political parties: they should not try to manipulate the game, they should reveal 
their real preferences and should not adjust their policy proposals for the wrong reasons, e.g. 
due to an unbalanced or inaccurate presentation of trade offs and effects.  
 Rules used for evaluating election platforms serve different purposes. Three different 
purposes of such rules can be distinguished: 
• Independence of the political process;  
• Good communication between the political parties and the evaluator;   
• Good quality of the evaluation and limited room for gaming and free lunches. 
 
Table 4. Rules for independence of the political process. 
 
1. Election platforms are only evaluated on request of the political party involved.  
2. All political parties (likely to be) represented in the parliament can participate. 
3. All political parties are treated as equally important. 
4. Election platforms are evaluated as if the party is the government and has all seats in Parliament. 
5. The evaluator informs the parties in advance about the time schedule, rules, topics and presentation. 
6. Political parties do not get information about the policy proposals made by other political parties. 
7. The evaluator does not communicate with the press about first results. 
8. Policy proposals and results are presented in a uniform way; the text is descriptive and neutral. 
9. In text and tables, parties are ranked by the current number of seats in Parliament.  
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 provide for each of these purposes an overview of the rules used in the 
Netherlands.  
 An election platform is only evaluated on request of political parties (rule 1 in Table 
4). What are the advantages and drawback of this rule in comparison to the alternative of 
obligatory participation? The rule of voluntary participation has two drawbacks. Firstly, 
evaluation will only occur on requested by a political party, even when political and 
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economic circumstances indicate major benefits of such analysis. Secondly, when not all 
political parties request an evaluation, voters will get an incomplete set of information.  
 Nevertheless, this Dutch rule has some clear merits. It avoids a conflict with a 
political party that does not want its political platform being analyzed. Ensuring the 
cooperation of the political party is also important for a proper interpretation of the policy 
proposals. Furthermore, the number of parties participating in the analysis of election 
platforms has gradually increased to nearly all political parties. As a consequence, the 
evaluation now compares the election platforms of nearly all political parties.  
 A major reason for this seems to be the revelation principle (see also Lecq, 2003). The 
parties with the ‘best’ and most solid and honest economic plans have an incentive to 
participate. But then not participating provides a negative signal to the voters. The revelation 
principle will also apply in case of obligatory participation, i.e. when an expert institute 
decides unilaterally to start evaluating election platforms irrespective of whether the political 
party consents or not.  Knowing that their election platform will be analyzed anyhow, 
political parties may decide to cooperate and provide extra details on their plans in order to 
avoid negative signaling and publicity.   
 A major drawback of obligatory participation is that parties do not want to cooperate 
and do not want to clarify and specify their policy proposals. This limits the quality, detail 
and scope of the evaluation. However, also for obligatory participation, the revelation 
principle may work in the longer run and induce political parties to cooperate and provide 
more information.  
 During the evaluation process, political parties are not allowed to see the policy plans 
of the other political parties (rule 6 in table 4). Similarly, they are informed about the draft 
and final results of the effects of their policy plans, but they are not informed about those of 
the other parties. This information is only disclosed after official publication of the evaluation 
of election platforms. Such information may then contain surprises. For example, some party 
may have innovative proposals that would have also suited their party. It may also turn out 
that they cut/spend less on a specific policy theme than another party. This may conflict with 
their political profile, e.g. being the party that is most environmental friendly, champion for 
education, best for the poor income, best for realizing a smaller government or solid public 
finance.   
 
 
 - 27 - 
 
 
Table 5. Rules for good communication between political parties and the evaluator 
 1. Policy proposals send to the evaluator are regarded as the election platform. 
2. Statements by political parties in the press are not the responsibility of the evaluator.  
3. The evaluator is transparent about the methodology to be used.  
4. The evaluator publishes the baseline projection before the analysis of election platforms. 
5. Political parties can change their policy proposals during the game. 
6. Political parties can ask the evaluator for advice, e.g. how to meet their targets in alternative ways. 
7. Political parties can put forward text proposals for the description of their policy proposals.  
 
The proposals send to the evaluator are evaluated and not the election platforms officially 
published by political parties (rule 1 in table 5). This is done for two reasons.  
 The first reason is that official election platforms do not contain sufficiently clear and 
well-specified information about the policy proposals. Official election platforms are mostly 
qualitative, focused on convincing potential voters and without much specification of policy 
measures proposed. A frequent annex of such official election platforms is a simple 
budgetary overview. What is needed for the evaluation can be regarded as extended and more 
detailed version of such a budgetary overview. For example, the simple budgetary overview 
may show that subsidies are to be cut by 1 billion euro. But in order to assess whether this is 
practically and legally feasible and to be able to say something about its consequences more 
specification is needed: which subsidies are to be cut by which amount? 
 The second reason is the interactive nature of the evaluation (see rules 4 and 5 in table 
5). When the evaluation is published some months after official election platform, this 
interaction is likely to have resulted in some changes in a party’s policy proposals. The 
analysis of election platforms has therefore much similarities with a mix of topdown- and 
bottom-up budgeting (see Ljungman, 2009): some general targets in terms of government 
deficit and debt or other variables like the purchasing power of various groups of households 
are usually defined at the start and these are then made consistent with the initial set of 
specific policy proposals after one or more rounds of negotiations and deliberations. This 
may result in changing or deleting such specific policy proposals or adding new ones, but it 
may also imply that the level of ambition in terms of general targets is adjusted.   
  Advantages of this interaction between political parties and the evaluator are that the 
policy proposals become more realistic, detailed and effective in reflecting and meeting the 
party’s economic and political preferences. Drawbacks are that the evaluation takes more 
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time and resources and may also allow more room for strategic and misleading behaviour by 
political parties.  
 More in general, evaluation of election platforms could be regarded as two way 
interaction between policy makers and economists15. First, it gives economists an opportunity 
to inform politicians. This is well appreciated by Dutch politicians: “The evaluation of 
election platforms is one of the most pleasant of our jobs, a real highlight. We have a special 
team put together for this. You learn a lot, for example how to translate general policy ideas 
into specific policy proposals. You get a good notion of the major policy tools for the various 
policy targets.” “We often use the booklet. It is well written. The overview comparing the 
policy platforms does not always provide good news, but gives a fair view of the choices 
made by the different political parties.”16  
 Secondly, the evaluation of election platforms gives politicians also an opportunity to 
inform economists, e.g. about their political preferences and the issues and trade-offs they are 
interested in. The evaluation of election platforms can therefore provide important feedback 
for the economic expert institute involved: by analyzing a broad range of policy proposals 
from (many) different political parties, the relevance and quality of models, knowledge and 
skills are tested. Economists involved in the evaluation are also generally very positive: “It is 
one of the most exciting and interesting jobs for a young economist at CPB and well worth 
the many extra working hours.” “Good for CPB and good for the country.” 
 The evaluator is transparent about the methodology to be used (rule 3 in table 4.2). 
This may include separate publications on the models used, literature surveys on the 
effectiveness of various type of policy measures (e.g. with respect to education) or studies on 
the efficiency of national  institutions with respect a policy area (e.g. housing market, 
education, health care or social security).  
The evaluator publishes the baseline projection before the evaluation of election platforms 
(rule 4 in table 5). Publications on the baseline may also include statements on the 
consequences of specific policy proposals. For example, a study on the sustainability of 
public finance may include also an overview of major policy proposals that could be 
considered to improve sustainability.    
                                                 
15
 A similar conclusion but about empirical models and policy making was drawn by Butter and Morgan (2000).  
16
 Statement during evaluation of last year’s evaluation of election platforms.   
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 Political parties can put forward text proposals for the description of their policy plans 
(rule 6 in table 5). However, the text should be neutral and descriptive and should not contain 
all kinds of unwarranted marketing statements.  
 Political parties are not allowed to opt out for one or more issues (rule 1 in table 6); 
they could only decide not to participate at all or participate on all issues. One political party 
did not want an analysis of the consequences for the environment, but decided nevertheless to 
participate.  This rule of not allowing opting out for some issues seems to contradict the rule 
that political parties are free to decide whether to participate.  
 Analyzing election platforms is quite different from forecasting. Macro-economic 
forecasts by CPB and other institutes are indeed not very accurate. The uncertainty of the 
baseline projection as such is not a problem provided it is not (politically) biased and people 
are sufficiently aware of the uncertainty of the projection.  Furthermore, for analyzing and 
comparing election platforms the same baseline projection is used for all political parties, e.g. 
on the macro-economic development and the sustainability of public finance. 
Table 6. Rules for quality and objectivity of the evaluation 
 1. Political parties cannot opt out for one or more topics. 
2. The baseline projection is a neutral extrapolation based on the assumption of unchanged policy. 
3. Only new policy proposals are included; this excludes policy in the baseline projection.  
4. The same methodology is used for evaluating the election platforms of all parties. 
5. Only policy proposals are included that are sufficiently clear and well-specified.   
6. Only policy proposals that can be made (unilaterally) by central government are included. 
7. Policy proposals should be legally and practically feasible during the next period of government. 
8. Policy measures of which the effects cannot be assessed sufficiently reliably are not included. 
9. Policy proposals should have real effects during the next period of government. 
 
 
However, the baseline is very important for the framing of policy proposals, e.g. because 
politicians and voters are myopic and loss-averse (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1986 and 
Kahneman, 2003).  The baseline used is a neutral extrapolation based on unchanged policy. 
But different macro-economic assumptions influence the perceptions of the sustainability of 
public finance and the development of real income of households.  
 Also the definition of unchanged policy is very important for such perceptions. What 
is unchanged policy, e.g. for taxes, social benefits and expenditure on education, 
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infrastructure and health care? Should a strict legalistic approach be taken or should e.g. the 
developments during last 5 or 10 years corrected for policy changes and demographic 
changes be extrapolated? Policy included in the baseline is by definition not included in the 
evaluation of election platforms. As a consequence, depending on the baseline, a policy 
proposal can be included in the evaluation or not. Promises by political parties in their 
election platforms about not raising taxes or guaranteeing the real income of poor households 
will have a different meaning depending on the baseline. Different assumptions about 
unchanged policy can also sketch a rather different picture of the problems to be solved by 
the next government. For example, according to a strict legalistic approach, public finance 
may be sustainable, but according to a more economic and plausible approach there may be 
serious budgetary problems to be solved.   
 The baseline by the evaluator used for the next period of government (see CPB, 
2010c) is to a substantial extent legalistic, but is in several respects also quite different from a 
purely legalistic approach. A major example is health care. The total public and private 
expenditure on health care are expected to increase by 4% per year in real terms, i.e. 
corrected for the general price change of GDP. This is more than could be expected due to 
only economic growth (1 3/4%) and ageing. It is assumed that public expenditure on health 
care for each age cohort increase in line with economic growth and that the remaining 1% 
increase per year is financed privately. This would mean a drastic increase of private 
expenditure on health care that would affect the real income of households substantially. In 
their election platforms, politicians can decide whether to agree with the assumption of a 
drastic increase in private health care expenditure, or whether to take supplementary 
measures, e.g. further increasing social security contributions for health care or find ways to 
reduce the rise of total health care expenditure, e.g. by efficiency gains.  
 Similarly, the baseline for the long term calculations on sustainable public finance 
assumes constant arrangements, i.e. the same quality of social benefits and public services for 
the same level of tax-rates (see van der Horst et al, 2010, p. 15-17). This assumption is also 
used by similar studies by the European Commission and OECD. What does this assumption 
mean? Individual public expenditure, like old age benefits, unemployment benefits and 
expenditure on health care and education, the expenditure per person/pupil (by age cohort) 
are linked to the general increase in wage rates. Collective public expenditure, like that for 
defense, infrastructure, subsidies to corporations and public administration, are linked to the 
development of GDP and are therefore assumed to stay constant as a percentage of GDP.  
Taxes are assumed to remain constant as a percentage of the tax base, e.g. income for the 
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income tax and private consumption expenditure for VAT and excise duties. This is clearly 
not a legalistic approach. For example, according to Dutch law the major tax bracket for 
income tax should increase in line with price change and not in line with wage rates. A 
legalistic approach would mean that in the long run all households become subject to the 
highest tax rate of 52%. This would solve all problems of the sustainability of Dutch public 
finance, but would not provide a realistic picture of the future.     
 Widening the scope of analysis is often important to provide a more balanced picture 
of the effects and trade-offs of policy proposals (see section 3). It also helps to avoid free 
lunches, i.e. policy proposals which seem to have only benefits and no drawbacks. However, 
in order to avoid free lunches, specific rules are needed to decide which policy proposals 
should not be included in the evaluation at all. The latter implies to serve no lunch at all for 
the political party.    
 Some policy measures amount simply to double-counting, e.g. policy measures 
already included in the baseline scenario. For example, the future revenues of natural gas and 
the financial assets of the social security funds are already included in the baseline projection 
on the government budget. As a consequence, proposals to use future revenue of natural gas 
or the assets of social security funds to improve the government budget, to reduce tax rates or 
to finance extra expenditure are not accepted.  
 Some policy measures are no policy measures, as they are just an alternative estimate 
of some revenue or expenditure in the baseline.  
 Other policy measures only amount to a re-arrangement of the financial portfolio of 
the government or a re-arrangement of revenue and expenditure between various parts of the 
general government should also be ignored. For example, the sale of offices and leasing them 
back. Introducing transfers or financial transactions between various parts of general 
government without changing the overall budget deficit and net worth will also be ignored, 
e.g. transferring the substantial financial assets of Dutch provinces to the Dutch central 
government.    
 Some policy measures are presented as ‘magical solutions’ for improving government 
finance. Tanzi’s chronicle of the bankruptcy of Argentine (2007) gives some beautiful 
examples, e.g. tax revenues would be boosted by privatization of tax collection, more 
sophisticated computers for tax collection or the introduction of a single tax on all 
transactions while abolishing all other taxes. In general, it is wise to be very skeptic to such 
magical solutions, to ignore them in scoring and to motivate why it is not only uncertain but 
also very unlikely that such proposals will solve any of the budgetary problems.  
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 Several specific rules serve also as a filter for accepting policy proposals. A first rule 
is that policy proposals should be specified sufficiently. For example, a proposal to improve 
the labour market position of the young, the elderly or the low-educated should be specified 
further. Not only the amount of money available should be known, but also the design of the 
specific policy proposals, e.g. via more schooling, less social benefit or a tax credit. Without 
specification, the efficiency of these proposals and the distributional consequences cannot be 
assessed.  
  A second rule is that policy proposals should be (unilaterally) subject to decision-
making by the central government. For example, the central government cannot decide how 
local government, the European Commission or private social housing corporations should 
spend their money. The government has also a limited influence on agreements between 
employers and trade unions, e.g. on wage moderation and pension contracts. Only decisions 
that can be made by the central government are included in the evaluation, e.g. cutting 
general or specific transfers to local government or changing the tax treatment of pensions. 
Contributions to the EU cannot be reduced unilaterally by the government, as this is the 
subject of negotiations at European level. Similarly, wage rates of civil servants cannot be 
reduced unilaterally, as this is the subject of negotiations with the trade unions. The outcome 
of such negotiations depends critically on the labour market.  
 A third rule is that the policy proposal should be legally and practically feasible 
during the next period of government. For example, abolishing provinces requires a change in 
the constitution and can therefore not be realized in one period of government. Similarly, 
European laws and international agreements on human rights drastically limit the possibilities 
to further tighten asylum policy.   
 A fourth rule is that policy proposals whose consequences cannot be assessed reliably 
are ignored. For example, the economic effects of major reform of the institutions in health 
care –introducing a free market for hospitals: allowing the free entry of privately funded 
hospitals and allowing loss making hospitals to go bankrupt- are hard to assess.  
 The sustainability analysis opened the way for proposals that were relevant only for 
their effects on the long run. Hence, the evaluator has imposed a number of constraints for the 
long term effects of a policy to be included in the sustainability analysis: First, the proposal 
must have real effects during the current election cycle. Second, the proposal must be 
logically defendable. E.g. a proposal to raise the retirement age by 1 day by the end of the 
election cycle, and by 5 years in some 20 years from now, is not viewed as logical proposal. 
Obviously, the 1 day increase is only included to meet the first requirement. Third, we cut off 
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the effect of gradual changes by 2040, to avoid proposals with effects that are quantitatively 
important only after 2040. One party proposed to cap mortgage deductibility at 1 million euro 
and not to index this cap forever. Practically nobody has a house above this cap today, but 
without indexing that will be totally different 40 years from now. Hence, the big revenues 
come in the far future. Finally, the evaluator is very reluctant to include proposals that affect 
tax rates and the like, because tax rates are typically decided upon in a yearly policy cycle. 
Claiming that you raise the tax rate in 10 years from now is therefore non-credible. To the 
contrary, raising the retirement age by one month a year over the next 24 years is credible. 
Societies do not decide on the rules for retirement every year. Hence, such a proposal is 
credible.  
 The latter constraint introduces a distinction between institutions with and without 
commitment value. True as this distinction between credible and non-credible proposals may 
be, it introduces a large degree of discretion on the side of the evaluator. This is undesirable, 
since the evaluator can easily be accused of being a politician instead of evaluating political 
platforms. However, this type of judgments is unavoidable if one wants to include an analysis 
of the long term effects of election platforms in their evaluation. Indeed, experience shows 
that political parties seek the boundaries of the rules outline before. They seek proposals that 
minimize the impact on purchasing power next election cycle, but that maximize the impact 
on the sustainability gap. Clearly, these rules are a binding constraint. 
 Most policy proposals are not free lunches but involve trade-offs or effects that may 
be difficult to quantify. Two examples can illustrate how the evaluator then nevertheless tries 
to come up what pragmatic solutions. This can be done quantitatively, but could also be 
solved by a qualitative analysis or restatement of the proposal or in the description of the 
proposal in the evaluation. Sometimes, it may also be necessary to introduce an additional 
rule, e.g. a maximum on the budget cut for civil servants.  
 A very common proposal is to reduce fraud with taxes and social security benefits by 
‘better inspection and detection methods’. Without any specification of the difference with 
current methods to detect and reduce fraud, no savings are recorded. Also, such new or more 
intensive methods generally first cost extra money. A practical compromise often used is that 
the political party ‘invests’ some money (say 300 mln euro) for improving or extending 
detection methods and that this leads to a saving of exactly the same amount of money by 
reducing tax and social benefit fraud.   
 Our second example refers to proposals for reducing the number of civil servants. 
This often seems to be a free lunch, as possible negative effects of such budget cuts on 
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quality and quantity of the services provided are difficult to assess in advance. In case of 
substantial cuts on the tax office, reduction of tax revenue may even seem to be likely, but 
how to estimate then by how much? However, when political parties have to specify their 
proposal, these proposals become much less a free lunch. For example, reducing the number 
of civil servants of the central government by 20% would imply that all major units are cut by 
this percentage. However, 25% of the number of civil servants of the central government is 
the tax office, 30% consist of police, prison and administration of justice and 8% work on 
road maintenance or planning new infrastructure.  Political parties are generally not willing to 
make major cuts in these units of central government; such cuts become also visible in 
overview table on budget cuts, e.g. in the functions public administration, safety and 
infrastructure and in the table on employment effects for the government sector. Many of the 
proposals are often also overlapping, e.g. proposals for a general efficiency cut, a reduction of 
overhead, a reduction of the purchase of consultancy services, some years no compensation 
for inflation and many additional cuts for specific units of government. As a consequence, by 
having to specify their plans they usually also substantially modify and reduce their proposed 
budget cuts.  In the description of such proposals, the evaluator makes also explicit that these 
budget cuts are generally not or only to a limited extent increases in efficiency.  
 A new situation occurred last year: in the baseline scenario already substantial budget 
cuts were included for the central and local government and nearly all political parties wanted 
on top of that very substantial extra budget cuts. Making the consequences of their proposals 
explicit via tables and text was not sufficient anymore. In order to keep the proposals realistic 
for only one period of government, maxima for budget cuts -on top of what was already in 
the baseline scenario- had to be set by the evaluator. These maxima were partly inspired by 
just released government reports discussing various alternatives for fundamental reform of 
the government budget. For central government, the maximum was 9% for some parts and 
6% for the rest. For local government, 20% reduction of the general transfer to provinces was 
accepted and 10% of those to municipalities. On some other parts, more budget cuts were 
allowed, e.g. for defense a larger percentage is plausible in one period of government 
considering the high share of short term contracts, the importance of purchases of military 
goods and investments and the possibility to obtain substantial revenue by selling military 
and non-military assets.    
 Such rules for filtering policy proposals are intended to make the evaluation more 
reliable and realistic. However, they could also serve as a filter biased against innovative 
policy proposals. Skepticism of the evaluator regarding the existence of free lunches might in 
 - 35 - 
 
 
fact favor small groups of insiders who collect large rents that could potentially be extracted 
to the benefit of the wider public. The skepticism regarding the feasibility of such reforms 
acts as a conservative force. Changing the rules during the game and inventing rather ad hoc 
rules, e.g. a maximum on specific budget cuts, introduces a substantial amount of 
arbitrariness. When this occurs, this should be well motivated by the evaluator. The quality of 
these arguments in combination with the general reputation of the evaluator is then crucial for 
retaining the credibility of the evaluation.    
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5.      Conclusions 
 
Summing up, there is a wide variety of approaches to the evaluation of election platforms, 
each with their own pros and cons. A comprehensive and long term analysis allows a more 
balanced presentation of all relevant tradeoffs and implications that are otherwise easily 
swept under the carpet. However, showing these tradeoffs and implications in a sufficiently 
reliable and impartial way may be hard and will demand substantial resources and economic 
skills. Moreover, the presentation of these tradeoffs by the evaluator must be perceived by an 
overwhelming majority of the political parties and the voters as being fact based and 
scientifically justified.  If such resources and skills are not available or if a broad agreement 
on the relevant tradeoffs is absent, then it is preferable to constrain the scope of the analysis. 
In general, the evaluator should take great care not to become part of the political game. That 
requires that he constrains himself to positive statements, and that he is aware of the fact that 
constraining political decision making to a choice of the appropriate welfare distribution is 
trying to lock politicians up in a far too small domain.    
 Evaluating election platforms is in many respects not high tech-economic analysis, 
e.g. based on one very big econometric model with thousands of equations. It is a mixed bag 
of analyses, assumptions and facts: simple and sophisticated analysis, bookkeeping and 
behavioural analysis, macro and micro, quantitative and qualitative, assumptions about 
unchanged policy and use of all relevant information, in particular about the government 
budget and the national economy, institutions and laws.   
 Evaluating election platforms could be regarded as a game for competing political 
parties. The rules of this game should ensure the objectivity and quality of the evaluation, 
give the right incentives to political parties and limit the room for gaming and free lunches.
 Voluntary participation by political parties seems to give voters an incomplete set of 
information. However, in the Netherlands nearly all political parties request for participation, 
as they do not want to give voters the negative signal that they have something to hide or fear 
from such evaluation. This information revelation principle may also apply in case of 
obligatory participation. Knowing that their election platform will be analyzed anyhow, 
political parties may decide to cooperate with the evaluator in order to avoid negative 
signaling and publicity.   
 Over time the scope of analysis is likely to increase in order to cover the loopholes of 
more partial evaluation or to better incorporate the major different political preferences and 
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issues. A more encompassing scope of analysis will then also increase the willingness of 
political parties to participate.  
 Dutch practice shows that evaluating election platforms can help to reach consensus 
on policy issues. For example, to what extent are budget cuts needed to improve the health of 
public finance, to what extent are the budget cuts proposed sufficient for this, what are the 
consequences of policy measures for the real income of poor households and how effective 
are the various tools to reduce unemployment?   
 The credibility and commitment of election platforms depends critically on their link 
with actual policy, i.e. to what extent will the promises made in the election platforms be 
reflected in coalition agreements and policy practice? It is therefore very important that the 
evaluation of election platforms is embedded in the political calendar and decision-making 
process.   
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